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Abstract: This inquiry seeks to establish that Lina Khan’s work brings to light the 
importance of reforming institutions in order to address the challenges of internet 
technology. As the dominance of a small number of technology giants has 
increased to unforeseen proportions, legal mind Lina Khan has emerged as a 
leading voice in the call for an updated legal framework, as well as a revision of 
current economic understanding, to address the new forms of monopoly power 
these firms practice. The first part of this inquiry examines Chicago School 
dominance over economic thought and its effect on antitrust enforcement over the 
past 40 years. The second part looks at the particular challenges that internet 
technology presents to today’s antitrust policymakers. The third and final part 
considers Lina Khan’s call for a revival of a structural understanding of market 
dynamics, which she terms “economic structuralism”.  
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This inquiry seeks to establish that Lina Khan’s work helps to us to understand the 
importance of reforming institutions in order to address an array of challenges 
related to internet technology. As the dominance of a small number of technology 
giants has increased to unforeseen proportions, legal mind Lina Khan has emerged 
as a leading voice in the call for an updated legal framework to address the new 
forms of monopoly power these firms practice. Khan comes to the conclusion that 
firms have been able to acquire market dominance due to a combination of two 
main factors. The first is the rise of Chicago School ideological dominance, which 
stripped away the structural understanding of the economy previously embodied in 
antitrust law enforcement. The second is the technology of the internet, which 
allows for new forms of market control. In response to these challenges, Khan 
proposes a revival of a structural understanding of the economy, updated to today’s 
technological and economic realities. 
 
The Chicago School’s Dominance 
In order to address the current challenges faced by antitrust policymakers, Khan 
emphasizes the importance of recognizing the impact of Chicago School 
ideological dominance in weakening enforcement. The title of Khan’s most 
significant scholarly work, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox” (2017), is a direct 
response to the 1978 book The Antitrust Paradox by highly influential Chicago 
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School proponent Robert Bork. Bork, who became Solicitor General under 
President Richard Nixon in 1973. Bork outlined a stance favorable to big business 
and worked successfully to narrow grounds of antitrust enforcement. Under his 
influence, antitrust enforcement and interpretation changed dramatically, allowing 
for big business to thrive. Khan (2017, 727) notes that the paradigm of antitrust 
enforcement initiated by Bork has only developed further since the 1970’s. The 
dominance of the Chicago School (named for the University of Chicago, from 
which its foremost scholars hailed) has been so complete, Khan (2017, 742) points 
out, that it extends to politically liberal thinkers as well. In an article for the online 
publication Quartz, Khan (2014) noted that writers for liberal media outlets such as 
New York Magazine, Vox, and The New York Times, under this influence, made 
arguments that Amazon was not a monopoly. The nearly universal acceptance of 
the propositions of Bork and the Chicago School has helped to render antitrust 
enforcement powerless, with deleterious effects to markets.  
The alleged “paradox” in Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox was that large size 
in companies did not promote the abuses of monopoly power; instead, large size 
provided efficiencies that benefited consumers. Such a pro-big business stance was 
echoed at large by the Chicago School. Khan (2017, 719) points out that Chicago 
School conclusions rest on the presumption that structural features of markets are a 
reflection of the most efficient modes of production, rather than a determining 
3 
 
factor of how agents behave. Quoting author Marc Allen Eisner, who wrote a book 
about how anti-regulation policy makers (mis)invoked Chicago School economics 
to further their agenda, Khan (2017, 719) summarizes the Chicago School view as: 
“what exists is ultimately the best guide as to what should exist.” In other words, 
this world is, inherently, the best of all possible worlds.  
Bork’s view, Khan (2017, 730) writes, narrowed the grounds on which 
antitrust was to be judged from a broad range of factors to the lone standard of 
consumer welfare. Bork put forth the argument that predatory pricing aimed at 
securing monopoly power almost never occurred. Furthermore, largeness in 
companies, rather than being a cause for alarm, was reinterpreted in his analysis as 
a boon to efficiency due to economies of scale and the smoothing effect of 
replacing market transactions with administrative decisions. Finally, Khan (2017, 
733-4) notes that the Chicago School developed the “single monopoly profit 
theorem.”  The theorem held that each market had a finite amount of surplus 
available to extract, and this amount could not be increased through entering into 
vertically related markets. Armed with this analysis, Bork and the Chicago School 
argued that vertical integration was attractive not because of increased market 
power but because of increased efficiency. Mergers and acquisitions that resulted 
in vertical integration would, with Bork’s view as a guide, no longer be a target of 
antitrust enforcement.  
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It was not only the content of its proposals—in favor of bigness, skeptical of 
intervention— that defined the Chicago School, but also its methodology. Khan 
(2017, 744) notes that Chicago School analysis shifted focus from process to 
outcome. Rather than examining how market power affected the structure of 
markets, the analysis shrunk to one question: whether prices were unreasonably 
higher. This was taken to answer the only relevant question of antitrust, the 
question of consumer welfare. Khan (2017, 728-9) explains that court cases 
established this as the basis of judgment in the form of something called 
recoupment analysis. The seminal case Matsushita v. Zenith Co (1986) invoked 
Bork’s arguments to strike down a claim of predatory pricing. In 1993, Brook 
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp followed up on Matsushita, 
solidifying its precedent with the introduction of the “recoupment test” to be used 
as the basis of judgment. Under this test the burden of antitrust prosecution was to 
show that aggressive pricing would eventually lead to prices high enough to 
compensate for earlier losses, including, following Chicago School analytical 
methodology, the “time value” of the money forgone during the predatory phase. 
Khan (2017, 730) notes that with the introduction of the recoupment test, predatory 
pricing became extremely difficult to prove, and antitrust enforcement effectively 
took a huge blow. 
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Challenges Associated with Technology 
Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox came out in 1978. Just a year earlier, Apple had 
come out with its Apple II computer, which over the next sixteen years reached 
millions of consumers; meanwhile, the development of the technological 
foundations of the internet were well underway—wide-area networks were 
established in the 1960’s, and the first commercial domain would be registered in 
1985. The reigning of the Bork regime of antitrust enforcement, in other words, 
came just as the technology of personal computers and the closely tied technology 
of the internet were beginning to develop. Over the next forty years, a new terrain 
of media and commerce opened up, with the path for ambitious entrepreneurs all 
the wider due to the Chicago School’s business-friendly blessing. 
The massive transformation to the way business is conducted instigated by 
the internet is still in process. The declaration of bankruptcy in October 2018 by 
Sears, “the original everything store,” as an article by Tiffany Hsu (2018) in The 
New York Times called it, seemed to mark a definitive transition to the new 
“everything store,” Amazon. A 2018 Times article by Michael Corkery makes a 
direct comparison of the two as stars of their respective gilded ages. All 
companies, at this point, are obligated to incorporate internet or computer 
technology into all aspects of their business. However, companies that operate as 
major platforms—in particular, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Amazon—have 
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central positions in the consumer experience of the internet; as such, any company 
that needs to reach consumers must utilize these platforms. This centrality of 
position equates to an enormous amount of power. 
In her essay, “Sources of Tech Platform Power” (2018), Khan examines how 
these companies make use of their position to expand and entrench their power. 
Khan (2018, 326) identifies three main tactics: gatekeeping; leveraging; and the 
exploitation of data. Khan notes that these platforms are peculiar beasts, in that 
they function at once as multi-sided platforms, advertising firms, media outlets, 
and lastly, as manufacturers, publishers, and sellers of their own products. The 
conflicts of interests that result are rampant, and, as Khan (2018, 326) notes, they 
can effectively use their position to set the terms of business for producers, 
retailers, advertisers, app developers, and publishers.  
The first tactic, gatekeeping, refers to the ability of large tech companies to 
use their position as necessary vehicles for sales as a powerful bargaining tool in 
contract negotiation. Khan (2018, 326) notes the extent of these companies’ 
centrality: two operating systems, Apple and Google’s Android, run 99% of 
smartphones; nearly half of online sales, and over half of product searches, occur 
on Amazon; digital advertising sales, finally, overwhelmingly go through 
Facebook and Google. Khan points out that doing business with these companies is 
obligatory to have access to markets. In “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” Khan 
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discusses the significant blow Amazon has been able to effect on publishers as it 
has solidified its dominance in the online book and e-book sales markets. While 
negotiating with the Hachette publishing company, for instance, Khan (2017, 715) 
points out that Amazon took Hachette’s books off its site, effectively crippling the 
bargaining position of the publisher. Hachette, however, has fared better than 
many. Khan (2017, 766), supported by testimony from publishers, makes the 
argument that the pressures exerted by Amazon—in extracting fees, pressing for 
lower retail prices, and in dominating the main avenue of sales—have led to 
consolidation and lessening of diversity within the publishing industry.  
The second source of platform power, leveraging, results from the 
simultaneous position of these companies as platforms for other sellers and as 
sellers themselves. Khan (2018, 328) points out that these companies enter into 
direct competition with users of their platform. Because their algorithms control 
the order of search results, they can push their own products into prominence. 
Khan (2018, 328) notes that the European Commission, which is significantly 
more aggressive than the U.S. in antitrust enforcement, assessed Google a $2.7 
billion fine for guiding traffic towards its shopping platform rather than those of 
competitors. Additionally, Khan (2018, 328) notes research indicating that 
Amazon promotes its own apparel over competitors’ in product searches.  
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The last, and most daunting, source of platform power is data exploitation.  
This is the most powerful and, as Khan (2018, 333) points out, the most difficult to 
address instrument of power, because of its complexity, wide reach, and lack of 
precedence. For one, this form of power acts to buttress the other two. When 
companies use platform services, they provide a bounty of information regarding 
sales and strategy, helping platform businesses identify the most successful 
products and swoop in on promising markets. Google and Amazon also extract 
information through their cloud services, which companies use for content 
streaming, conducting online transactions, and websites hosting. On the other side 
of the platform, these companies extract a dystopian level of detail on consumers. 
Khan (2018, 329) notes that even the amount of time a customer moves their 
mouse over a “buy” button can be tracked. Khan (2018, 330) also points out the 
discriminatory way in which companies apply this information to their advertising 
businesses, targeting by race, age, and other characteristics, as well as to their 
product pricing, gauging personalized price points and selectively offering 
discounts. As revelations of Facebook’s practices concerning data sales and 
exploitation continue to emerge, we are still learning the extent of the 
consequences of data exploitation.  
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Lina Khan and Economic Structuralism 
In the face of these challenges, Khan calls for an overturn of the Chicago School 
regime. Khan makes the argument that the Chicago School analytical method, 
which focuses on prices, misses a number of serious problems that today’s 
companies pose. The “paradox” of Khan’s “antitrust paradox” is that despite the 
apparent boon to consumers, in fact large tech companies such as Amazon actually 
threaten consumer welfare, meaning they fail to meet the standard set by Bork and 
the Chicago School; but their negative impact goes far beyond that. As a Seattle 
Times article (2018) quoted Khan: “As consumers, as users, we love these tech 
companies. But as citizens, as workers and as entrepreneurs, we recognize that 
their power is troubling.” Khan’s solution is to recover and build on the precedents 
set before the rise of the Chicago School, employing what she refers to as 
“economic structuralism.” It is necessary, according to Khan (2017, 717), to look 
at the structure of a business and its “structural role” in relevant markets in order 
fully to understand its impact. The goal should be to ensure the functioning of a 
healthy competitive process. Importantly, at stake is not just the economy but the 
foundations of democracy.  
Lina Khan is far from the only legal scholar attempting to confront the new 
challenges presented by this age of technology; however, two distinct approaches 
exist. In one, the propositions of the Chicago School and mainstream economic 
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theory as it stands are more or less accepted; in the other, we find a call for an 
overturn at the level of approach. In her scholarly work, “The Ideological Roots of 
America’s Market Power Problem” (2018), Khan responds to a collection put out 
by the Yale Law Journal in which a number of legal scholars addressed the 
question of how to confront today’s monopoly issues. Khan’s criticism of the Yale 
Collection is that the authors fail to appreciate the fundamental way in which 
Chicago School ideas create obstacles to effective antitrust enforcement.  
Khan identifies her own approach as belonging to the “New Brandeisian 
School.” Her article, “The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly 
Debate” (2018), something of a manifesto, expounds five tenets of the School: The 
first is that “antimonopoly,” her word to encapsulate the New Brandeisian stance, 
is a critical instrument and philosophical foundation for structuring a truly 
democratic society. The second is that antimonopoly extends beyond antitrust: a 
multitude of approaches is necessary to protect competition. The third is that 
antimonopoly does not equate to a universal attack on bigness; natural monopolies 
exist and should be regulated rather than broken up. The fourth is that processes 
and structures, rather than outcomes, should be the central focus. The fifth is to 
deny the power of market “forces.” This final tenet stands in explicit opposition to 
the Chicago School. Khan argues that the economy does not stand on its own; 
rather law and policy determine the shape of a fundamentally political economy.   
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In “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” Khan (2017, 718) notes that a structural 
understanding of the economy was in operation until the 1970’s. Prior to the 
Chicago School’s takeover, antitrust law developed out of a desire to rein in the 
power that size and market centrality conferred upon large businesses. Khan (2017, 
723) points to the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, which was further strengthened by 
the 1914 Clayton Act; the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which barred price 
discrimination in transactions between retailers and producers, further expanded 
the terms of antitrust, newly invoking criminal, rather than just civil, law. John 
Hughes and Louis P. Cain’s American Economic History (2007, 370 and 401) 
point to the catalyzing factors of the growth of big business, on the one hand, and 
the political influence of the Populist Party, on the other, in the building of this 
antitrust framework. Furthermore, Hughes and Cain (2007, 374) point out (and 
Khan (2017, 798) notes the connection as well) that the Sherman Act built on 
earlier precedent set by the 1877 Munn v. Illinois case, which asserted the right to 
regulate private concerns if they had to do with “public interest.”  
Khan (2017, 737) addresses the Chicago School’s primary concern, the 
consumer, arguing that on the basis of consumer welfare alone, large tech 
companies have wielded power with significant negative consequences. Just 
looking at the Chicago School’s narrow grounds of price, Khan (2017, 738-9) 
argues, the consumer may be losing out. However, Khan emphasizes that the 
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components of consumer welfare go beyond just “low prices.” Consumers place 
value on the quality, diversity, and inventiveness of products. As seen in the case 
of the publishing industry, the effects of excess power can mean less consumer 
choice in markets vital to the cultural health of society. Khan (2017, 739) points to 
a recent decline in new businesses as a sign of increasing staleness in markets.  
Consumer welfare, however, cannot fully describe the harms caused by the 
new monopolists. Citing the intent of the creators and supporters of the 1890 
Sherman Antitrust Act and the early 20th Century Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis, Khan (2017, 741-2) makes the argument that the goals of antitrust 
measures are far more complex. First, lawmakers were concerned with the effects 
of dominant firm power not only on consumers but also on producers. Hughes and 
Cain (2007, 374), for instance, note that it was farmers threatened by railroad price 
fixing who helped bring the Munn trial to its conclusion. Furthermore, 
concentration of economic power is a sure conduit to outsize political power and, 
as such, a threat to democracy., As an article by Robinson Meyer (2018) in The 
Atlantic pointed out, this point was brought home when Lina Khan’s former 
employer, Open Markets, an antimonopoly research and advocacy group, was 
defunded by Google after issuing a criticism of the company.  
Finally, Khan emphasizes the importance of maintaining open markets. 
Again, Khan points to the views of Justice Brandeis, who believed in the necessity 
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of “industrial liberty.” The people at large, rather than a small elite, should be 
empowered to determine the direction of the economy. Economic concentration, 
on the other hand, allows dominant firms to control markets and determine the 
paths of market development. Khan (2017, 768-771) describes an instance of this 
power over path development in detailing the ruthless tactics Amazon used to drive 
a competitor, Quidsi, into insolvency, after it refused to be bought. Amazon, 
characteristically of the new monopolists, had at its disposal an unprecedentedly 
large stream of capital to execute predatory pricing and forgo profit. Part of the 
Amazon “paradox” has been that until the last few years, while Amazon’s stock 
price continued to soar, Amazon made no profit at all. 
Khan’s solution is to look at a variety of factors when determining whether 
firms pose a threat to the health of markets. Khan (2017, 746) lists five 
components that should be key focuses of the investigative process: barriers to 
entry; conflicts of interest; gatekeeping; control of information; and the bargaining 
power balance. She suggests that breaking companies up or, in the face of 
efficiencies of scale which should not be ignored, regulating behavior to 
counterbalance any available tools for abuse. This multifaceted approach would 
address the critical importance of a structurally sound and democratic political 
economy.  
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Conclusion 
This inquiry has sought to establish that Lina Khan’s work illuminates the 
importance of reworking institutions to deal with the technology of the internet. 
Khan is a leading voice in the growing call for regulation to tackle the forms of 
monopoly power exerted by technology companies. Her work represents an 
attempt to overturn Chicago School ideological dominance in favor of a more 
multifaceted analysis of market dynamics. The growing body of discourse calling 
for an ideological shift is, at least so far, just that. This new perspective has not 
infiltrated at the level of federal policy. Big firms still reign; technology firms still 
escape the understanding of policy makers. There are, however, signs that things 
may change. Even the University of Chicago, as The Economist (2017) noted, has 
recognized a need to recalibrate its analytical framework.  
If a new perspective is going to translate into effective policy, it will need to 
answer the Chicago School’s main contention: that policies aiming to make the 
world more equal and to disperse economic power ultimately reduce aggregate 
income enough that most people end up comparatively worse off. The Chicago 
School also claims on its side the instruments of rigorous mathematical economic 
analysis. A robust reply to the Chicago tradition would likewise wield a rigorous 
analysis in policy formulation, an analysis which should, if the new perspective is 
correct, reflect the contention that welfare—a concept correlated with aggregate 
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income but not the same—is served by pro-competitive policies. Additionally, the 
technical aspects of these firms must be understood in order for institutions to 
address the market appropriately. Khan (2018, 973) has noted that “heightened 
economic expertise” in judicial matters is, in this age, a necessity; technological 
expertise is as well. Policy makers and influencers will have to decide the extent to 
which any new perspective they embrace accommodates certain contentions and 
analytical instruments of the Chicago School or whether to reject its form of 
analysis altogether.  
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